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THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL
KENNETH J. HODSON LECTURE:
MILITARY JUSTICE FOR THE 1990’sA LEGAL SYSTEM LOOKING FOR RESPECT
by David A . Schlueter
Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University
The Kenneth J. Hodson Chair of Criminal Law was established at
The Judge Advocate General’s School on June 24, 1971. The chair
was named after Major General Hodson, who served as The Judge
Advocate Generalfrom 1967to 1971. General Hodson retired in 1971,
but immediately was recalled to active duty to serve as the Chief
Judge of the A m y Court of Military Review. He served in that position until March 1974. General Hodson served over thirty years on
active duty. During that time, he was active in the American and
Federal Bar Associations, and he authored much of the military
justice legislation existing today, He was a member of the original
staff and faculty of The Judge Advocate General’s School in Charlottesville, Virginia. When the Judge Advocate General’s Corps was
activated as a regiment in 1986, General Hodson was selected as the
Honorary Colonel of the Corps.

On March 28,1991, Pmfessor Schlueter delivered the twentieth Kenneth J. Hodson lecture. Professor Schlueter received his B.A. f r o m
lkxm A & M University in 1969, his J.D.f r o m Baylor University
School of Law in 1971, and a n U . M .f r o m the University of Virginia
School of Law in 1981. He served on active duty as a judge advocate
from 1972 to 1981. Professor Schlueter i s a Lieutenant Colonel i n
the United States A r m y Reserve and i s a n individual mobilization
augmentee to The Judge Advocate General’s School. He has published
numerous books and law review articles on criminal law t o p i e and
is currently the Reporter for the Federal Rules Advisory Committee
on the Rules of Criminal Procedure. I n addition, Professor Schluet4.r
has held m e r a l prominent positions in professional legal organizations and currently is the C h a i m a n of the ABA Standing Cornmittee o n Military Law.

I. INTRODUCTION
It is a double honor to be this year’s Hodson lecturer. First, I have
the highest regard for General Hodson. I always have respected
General Hodson and his contributions to the JAG Corps and the legal
profession in general. As some of you may be aware, he has been
1
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very active in the American Bar Association. I regret that he is not
able to be with us today. Second, being here today brings back pleasant and warm memories. In many ways the School is my second home,
and it is always good to be hack among friends.
In some respects I have been preparing my remarks for this occasion for almost twenty years. In the process of writing and talking
about military justice, I have had numerous opportunities to think
about, or as Justice Holmes wrote, “brood” about the law. Events
such as the annual Hodson Lecture are good for the system because
they provide an opportunity to step aside from the everyday hustle
and bustle of the practice of law, and to think for a moment about
the larger picture. Today, that larger picture is “Military Justice for
the 1990’s’’and its search for a little respect.

I have the highest respect for the military justice system. In my
view, it has many features that should be adopted by the civilian
criminal justice system. For example, features such as broad criminal
discovery, speedy trial provisions, and worldwide access to witnesses
and counsel have led people like F. Lee Bailey, a noted criminal
defense lawyer, to observe the value and benefits of military justice.
But the object of my time with you this morning is not to praise
the military justice system. I am sure you already know that the
system is sound. Rather, I would like to discuss with you what seems
to me to be a lack of respect for the system by the public and the
legal profession generally.
Because I have high regard for the system, and because it has been
a large part of my legal career, I am disturbed when I hear from those
who have no respect for the system.
How much have you heard about military justice from those outside the system? I know that my exposure to the criticisms of military
justice was extremely limited in the early years of my service on active duty. I was too wrapped up in the day-to-day grind of writing
appellate briefs, post-trial reviews, and trying cases to really spend
too much time thinking about the system. My first real exposure was
in my third year on active duty when I heard that a writer had compared military justice to military music. At about the same time I
became aware that my staff judge advocate at Fort Belvoir, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Poydasheff, was eo-authoring an article with
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Suter for the Tulane Law Review on the
merits of the military justice system.‘
’Poydasheff &I Suter. Military Justic.r?-Defi’nitrly!, 49 ‘ h i . L. Kev. 588 (1975).
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My perspective is broader now and is based not only upon my years
of active duty in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, but also on
my experiences as a civilian who has talked with many individuals
over the last twenty years about military justice. I have had countless
contacts with the media, military personnel, law students, and ordinary citizens-including my barber, who asked me the other day
whether I thought the military justice system was fair.

11. LOOKING FOR RESPECT:
NEGATIVE SOUND BITES

A . IN GENERAL
In the process of working within the system, several attempts have
been made to increase the stature and prestige of the military justice
system. For example, some have suggested that the names of the
military appellate courts be changed to the Army, Air Force, and
Navy Court of (Military) Appeals. This change is an attempt to increase the stature of military appellate courts. In the case of the
United States Court of Military Appeals, some have suggested that
it be changed from an article I to an article I11 court. Indeed, a few
years ago the name of the Court of Military Appeals was changed
by Congress by adding the words “United States” to make it clear
that it was a federal court and not simply a military court of appeals.
Why the search for respect? For increased prestige? In part, it is
an attempt to overcome the negative image that sometimes is attached to military justice. You are no doubt aware of the use of what
have become known as “sound bites,” media jargon for those short,
pithy, and catchy phrases that will stick with the public-those
phrases that seem to say it all.
Consider the following examples of bites regarding military justice.
Perhaps you have heard some of them:
“Military justice is to justice as military music is to music.”2
“Courts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law.”3
%
Sherrill,
I.
Military Justice is to Justice as Military Music is to Music (1970). Mr.
Sherrill presents a highly critical view of military justice. The title is a quote from
Clemeceau.
30’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (determining that only serviceconnected offenses were subject to court-martial jurisdiction).
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“The court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of
justice.”4
“Military justice is an oxymoron.”5
“Military Tribunals have not been and probably never can be
constituted in such a way that they have the same kind of
qualifications that the Constitution has deemed essential to fair
trials of civilians in federal courts.”G

Is this the same military justice system that I have been connected
with for almost twenty years and the system that you have been
studying Note that these negative bites or criticisms are about a
worldwide legal system that affects directly and indirectly literally
millions of United States citizens. True, there are negative impressions about civilian criminal justice systems as well. My sense, however, is that they do not run as deep as those associated with military
justice.

B. IDENTIFYING THE CRITICS
Who are the critics and why are they saying negative things about
military justice? Perhaps we could cut this presentation short by simply dismissing the negative sound bites as those of individuals who
have no knowledge about justice generally or have nothing good to
say about any system of criminal justice. Perhaps they are only quotes
from a bitter parent upon learning that a son or daughter has been
sentenced to prison for not following what was obviously an illegal
order or for being just a little late for chow. No such luck. They are
statements by commentators who have read the cases, by counsel
who have worked within the system, and yes, they include statements by Supreme Court justices.

C. BREADTH OF THE CRITICISM
The true depth and breadth of the “negative bites” is unknown.
As far as I know, no recent national surveys have been conducted
among the citizenry about their perceptions or feelings about military
justice. Nevertheless, I do feel safe in believing that a broad crosssection of intelligent people either know very little about military
justice or, if they do know something about the system, they believe
41d.
”Spak, M i l i t a r y Justice: ThR Oxymoron of the 1980’s, 20 Cal. W.L. Rev. 436 (1984).
%th v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).

4

HODSON LECTURE

19911

that it is still in the dark ages, void of any full legal recognition, and
certainly not deserving of a full membership in the family of enlightened jurisprudence. Clearly, it does not deserve “respect.”

D. REASONS FOR THE CRITICISM
1. In General
Why the negative bites? Why the criticism? What has the military
justice system done or failed to do that evokes such criticism? I believe
a number of possible reasons exist for the negative impressions that
many people have about military justice. Rightly or wrongly, they
believe the system is unfair and inept. Some of these reasons overlap
and are not the result of any poll or survey. Rather, they are the observations of one who has played on the field from time to time and
has sat next to the fans in the stands to hear what they have to say
about how the game is being played.

2. Reason One: Lack of Information
Even the best intentioned individuals do not have all the information. This is perhaps the easiest to address because many people simply have no reason to come in contact with military justice. Presumably, once these individuals have accurate information about the
system, they will be less likely to criticize it summarily.

3. Reason W o : Reliance on Old Data
Some misconceptions and criticisms are based upon outdated information about the way it once was-the days when a convening
authority could order a court-martial to reconsider its sentence with
the hope of raising the punishment, the dqys when a single counsel
served as both prosecutor and defense counsel, the days when the
prosecutor and the defense counsel both worked for the same person, the days when judges were not present in the courtroom and
the president of the court-martial was the presiding officer. As noted
by Judge Cox of the Court of Military Appeals, the military justice
system has evolved a great deal since that time.7Judge Kenneth Ripple, a former Navy JAGC officer who now sits on the Federal Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, believes that military justice is
a more “mature” system of justice.”

m

7 . b eCox, The: A m y ,
Cirrurts, rind thrn (,’onTtitutiori: E?’?xilutio,n
of MiliLrqy .Justirr,
118 Mil. L. Rev. 1 , 18 (1987).
“Ripple,FwYU)fn-d to I). Schlueter, Military Criminal .Justice: f’ractice and f’roc(dur(~
at xxiii (2d e d . 1987) [‘‘A new maturity has come to military law”).
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My first real exposure to the historical and changing roots of
military justice began in a legal history course offered at the University of Virginia in the late 70’s when, in fulfillment of a paper requirement, I worked my way through yellowed leaves of old codes
and old treatises on military justice. I was impressed with several
aspects. First, despite the fact that some features have not changed,
many aspects of military justice had changed dramatically. Second.
the element of “due process” had continued to expand in the military
setting, and in some cases set the pace for like changes in the civilian
setting.
The “unification” of military justice in the 1951 Uniform Code of
Military Justice, which replaced the Articles of War, was clearly a
major step forward. In the 1960’s,through the efforts of individuals
such as General Hodson, the system was “judicialized” by the addition of judges in the courtroom. Decisions of the Court of Military
Appeals in the 1970’scontinued to strengthen the role of the judge.
The 1980’s brought what some have termed the “civilianization of
military justice”-with the 1983 Military Justice Act and the 1984
Manual for Courts-Martial. Now, we might be entering a period of
what I call the ‘‘legitimization’’of military justice.
The system has changed-it has been improved upon in the sense
that the system is fairer. Checks have been provided to ensure fairer
and more just results. For many, however, the system used in the late
60’s,especially in Vietnam, is the system they remember-and detest.

4. Reason Three: Relying

oti

Fulse Data or Assicniptioris

Some critics simply do not have any real frame of reference to
military justice. They know only what they see on television or read
in the papers. For example, consider a recent episode of the popular
TV series, “LA Law.”
A young Army officer was charged with disobeying an order to fire
an artillery barrage on some buildings during the invasion of Panama.
His reason for not firing was that he had seen civilians in the area.
One of the law firm’s lawyers was asked to represent him. Whpn h e
was asked why he simply did not use the services of his military
defense counsel, he said something to the effect that his lawyer was
good, but, “. . . he wore a green uniform”-the implication being that
only a civilian lawyer could see that justice was done. H e was (*onvicted and received a heavy sentence.

Without belaboring the legal points, the scenario containcd st.vcral
6
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inaccuracies, and the public was left with an incomplete and misleading picture of military justice.
5. Reason Four: The Experience Factor

Some of the critics of military justice have been involved with the
system. Recently, the following letter appeared on the editorial page
of the San Antonio Light, in a city where the military generally is
held in high regard:

Noth ing M i t iga tes Pu n ish m e TZ t
in Military Justice Systenz
Regarding the trial arzd sentencing of Sgt Meeks: My henrt
goes out to h i m and to his family. I n July 1988, I was i~ the
same spot. Military justice is an oxymoron-there is no justice.
Once you are identified as an offendei; absolutely tzothi,ig will
deter the military law office from doing what it warits to do.
It does not matter how good n pwson you nre, how well yoti performed, the qualitiesof yoiirjobskills, or the ,~~i,~iber.of'letteis
of recmnmenclcltion (or who wrote t h m ) . They do not care about
your f a m ily circumstances.
AppeaLs a n d clemency appeals are yoicr right bitt cowmanders arid courts will not nlter o w th irig. Why? the trr ilitavy
lair center coritiriiies to oppose you. They brarid ewrythirrg got(
say as n lie. Whatetier they recouzvietid is a l i i ~ a y ns p p r o c ~ dhg
the comrriander because he will riot, does w t . o r carrrrot toke
the time to personally giiv the uiatter proper cotrsidemtiori.
But there is lrfe qfter the s e w i c e as lorrg ns y o r i dorr't let i t
get y01i dOlV?l.
ROL1'.4LD T4lZOR
Str ) I -4rrtorr i o 9
As the Air Force Court of Military Review recently ohserved. "No
man goes to the gallows with a good impression o f the law."1oC'learly, that young man does not have a good impression of militan. justice.
Whether he is right or wrong is irrelevant. Anyone reading that letter to the editor was exposed t o military justice for one brief
"negative bite" moment.
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6. Reason Five: The Rub-Off Factor
Some critics approach military justice with the attitude that if it
belongs to, or is run by, the military then it must to be unfair. “Isn’t
this the same system that serves SOS and MREs?” “Military justice.
Isn’t that the system run by folks with military minds?” “Isn’t that
the system that discriminates against homosexuals?” You get the picture. I have no doubt that the negative feelings toward the military
that resulted from Vietnam had a direct impact on the public’s
perception of military justice. Perhaps the recent military successes
in the Middle East, which have enhanced the public’s view of the
military in general, also will benefit military justice.
7. Reason Six: The Other Alternative
Another possibility exists. Perhaps there is some truth in what the
critics see and what they say. In day-to-day JAG Corps life, it is easy
to become complacent, to fail to see the forest because of the trees.
We are doing what a former JAG urged us to do: “Just cut the wood
that is put in front of you.” It was mentioned in the context of not
worrying about getting the right assignments, working for the right
people, etc. But while you are cutting the wood, it is important to
examine it, to measure it, to test its worth.

11. RESPONSES TO THE CRITICISMS:
CLOSE SCRUTINY
A . IN GENERAL
There is a simple saying that when you are right, ignore the criticism. When you are wrong, listen to the criticism. Let us assume,
for the purposes of argument, that some of the criticisms of the
military justice system are valid. That is, if the critics are right, what
should our response be?
These are not purely questions of academics. They are pragmatic
questions, and any suggested solutions should have utility. Changes
should not be made simply for the sake of change. Nor should changes
be made simply to silence the critics, or to increase or decrease the
conviction rate.
I have high regard for military justice. In my view, its benefits greatly outweigh whatever faults it may possess. Although one commen8
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tator has labelled me as a “defender” of military justice,” I always
have assumed that the military justice system is not perfect, that
there is room for change-for improvement. I also have assumed that
listening to, and thinking about, the “negative bites” is the first step
to improving the system. For example, I often have pondered about
what led Justice Douglas in 1960 to write that military courts are
singularly inept at dealing with constitutional questions.

B. WHY LISTEN To THE CRITICS?
Why should the military justice system pay any attention to what
the critics say? Is not the system currently providing ample due process? These questions were put to me several years ago by a military
judge in an audience I was addressing. Why should we care? Why
should we in the military care about what a federal district judge
sitting in Minnesota or Texas thinks about military justice? Let me
offer several reasons why the critics may deserve our ear.

1. Always Subject to Scrutiny: Someone Will Listen
First, even assuming the system is separate, it is always subject to
scrutiny-either internally or externally-in Congress, in the media,
or perhaps even in a federal court. It is important to remember that
the greatest time of change in the military justice system usually has
occurred immediately following a major war or conflict. This was particularly true after World War I, World War 11, and to some extent
during and after Vietnam. Granted, the federal courts today are for
the most part extremely deferential on military justice matters-probably due in large part to the fact that the services are composed of
voluntary enlistees. But I become concerned when I hear individuals
within the system register utter disdain for civilian control of the
system and suggest that civilian courts have no business secondguessing military justice. Like it or not, the system is constantly subject to scrutiny.

2.Not Entirely Separate From Society
Second, although the military justice system is a “separate system
of justice,” it is not entirely separate from the rest of society. It is
ultimately accountable to the civilian community-not simply civilian
legal review. The recent war in the Gulf pointed that out. The armed
forces consist of many citizen service members-mothers, fathers,
and children. That is particularly true of the reservists and National
“Spak, supra note 5 , at 464 n.179.
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Guard members. One day they were plowing fields, pulling teeth, or
teaching classes, and the next day they were stuck in a desert far
from home. They all have a potential interest in the military justice
system, and it seems appropriate that the public have confidence
in the system. Many of you are, or will be, active within the civilian
community as Little League coaches, PTA officers, leaders in your
religious organization, or members of the local bar associations. You
are not entirely separate from society simply because you wear a
uniform.

3. It Is the Right Thing to Do
Third, like eating oatmeal, it is the right thing to do. Criticisms
should not be ignored simply because they irritate or annoy us. If
we are wrong, then we should listen. Those participating in any legal
system have a professional and moral responsibility for policing the
system. Those who are within the system should be the first to step
forward and make changes where needed. In military jargon, those
within the system must be “proactive,” not simply “reactive.”

111. FEATURES OF MILITARY JUSTICE THAT
DESERVE SCRUTINY
Assuming that we decide to heed at least some of the criticisms,
where would we begin? What is a legitimate problem or issue? A
number of features of the system seem most vulnerable. They are
as follows:
A. The Purpose of Military Justice
B. The Concept of “Military Due Process”
C. Constitutional Protections
D. The Role of the Commander
E. The Role of the Military Judiciary
F. An Independent Court of Military Appeals
G. The Role of the Legal Profession
These points are listed in no particular order or hierarchy. Although
other issues may be equally important, these should serve as a good
starting point.

A . THE PURPOSE OF MILITARY JUSTICE:
JUSTICE OR DISCIPLINE?
In its earliest forms, the military justice system was designed to
10
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be an instrument of discipline. Military leaders could count on the
system to enforce the articles of war and their personal orders. The
system was at times rough by contemporary standards of due process. It would be difficult to say that, in its early forms, the military
justice system was an “independent” tool of justice-that is, a system
designed to determine if a person was guilty of a particular crime.
The debate over the two concepts has continued for years and will
certainly not be resolved by anything said here. I do not see the two
terms as being inconsistent. There should be no doubt, however, that
if military justice is to be viewed as a legitimate system of criminal
justice in today’s society, it must be viewed primarily as a tool of
justice.
Consider the following excerpt from a report made thirty years ago,
the 1960 Powell Report-a study of the military justice system by
high-ranking Army officers in a report to the Secretary of the Army
on the status of the UCMJ:
Discipline-a state of mind which leads to a willingness to
obey an order no matter how unpleasant or dangerous the task
to be performed-is not a characteristic of a civilian community. Development of this state of mind among soldiers is a command responsibility and a necessity. In the development of
discipline, correction of individuals is indispensable; in correction, fairness or justice is indispensable. Thus, it is a mistake
to talk of balancing discipline and justice-the two are
inseparable.
Once a case is before a court-martial it should be realized by
all concerned that the sole concern is to accomplish justice
under the law. This does not mean justice as determined by the
commander referring a case or by anyone not duly constituted
to fulfill a judicial role. It is not proper to say that a military
court-martial has a dual function as an instrument of discipline
and as an instrument of justice. It is an instrument of justice
and in fulfilling this function it will promote discipline.‘2
This excerpt from the report represents a sound balance. The distinctions between “justice’’ and “discipline” are subtle, but crucial to
whatever follows.
It seems to me that at the heart of the controversy is this ques]“The Powell Report, at 11, 12 (1960).

11
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tion: What is the purpose of the military justice system? In any given
case either “justice” or “discipline” may rise to the surface as the
predominant feature.
Consider the hypothetical case of Private Doakes, who is charged
with possession of drugs. What is the purpose of his court-martial?
What impact would his conviction and sentence have on his unit?
What impact would an acquittal have on his unit? On the installation? On the armed forces? Would your answers change if he was
charged with willful disobedience of his commanding officer’s order,
inciting a riot, throwing butter on the mess hall ceiling, shouting insults at his first sergeant, refusing to board a plane for Saudi Arabia,
or child abuse? For the most part, all of these crimes potentially affect “discipline.” In some of the charges, however, that would be less
apparent.
Left unchecked, those crimes also would affect the community in
which Doakes lived, but in varying degrees. If Doakes is punished
for crimes involving drugs, his punishment probably will be viewed
the same way as in a civilian community. “Don’t do drugs.” The same
would be true for child abuse. But what about the purely military
crimes, such as willful disobedience of an order? Does the military
justice system work in the same way? Does it have the same effect’?
Perhaps. In that case, the trial of Doakes by a court-martial takes
on an air of discipline because the commander’s very authority to
command the respect and obedience of the troops is at stake.
From a civilian perspective, using the court-martial to try military
offenses is an entirely different creature. While the community very
well might rally around the prosecution of a child abuser or drug
kingpin, I doubt that you will see the same support behind the prosecution of a soldier who will not soldier, is charged with AWOL, or
fails to show up for morning formation.
Using the same system to meet often competing goals raises problems of interpretation and perspective. Perhaps the answers lie in
separating those crimes that are purely disciplinary from those that
are what we ordinarily refer to as “common-law” crimes. The
military justice system always has lumped them all together because
of the need or desire to handle all justice problems within a single
system. I am not suggesting that any changes be made in what crimes
are triable by the court-martial. The system is worldwide and, in some
instances, military justice is literally the only law west of the proverbial Pecos river.
12

HODSON LECTVRE

1991)

If “discipline” is viewed as the final end-all for military justice,
the stereotypes will live on. As long as discipline even is listed as
a goal or purpose for military justice, there is a risk that the stereotype will live on. The risk exists that if the ends are something other
than “justice,” those participating in the system will view it as
nothing more than a rubber stamp for the commander. It is even more
troubling, however, if the community views the commander as the
rubber stamp for a legal system that gives the appearance of simply
serving the needs of discipline.

B. THE CONCEPT OF “MILITARY DUE
PROCESS”
1. Due Process Generally

The topic of “due process” is mentioned in both the fifth and the
fourteenth amendments: “No person shall be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law.” In the criminal context, it requires
that the right person be accused, that the right procedures be used,
and that the punishment is right. The concept of due process is fluid
and is more akin to a balancing test: Balancing the rights of those
accused, the interests of the public, and the relative costs of providing additional procedural safeguard~.’~
A hierarchy exists for applying due processJ4 At the bottom is the
United States Constitution, which provides the foundation. Generally, an accused is entitled to whatever procedural and substantive
rights the Constitution requires. In the civilian community. no
jurisdiction may provide less than mandated by the Constitution.
That rule, as I will point out in a minute, does not necessarily apply
in the military justice system. In addition to those derived from the
Constitution, rights are provided by statute, the Manual for CourtsMartial, and service regulations.
A similar template is used in state courts. The state constitutions
and statutes may provide greater protections than those found in
the United States Constitution.

2.O r i g i n

OJ

the Temi “Militccry Lhte Process“

So what is this term “military due process” and where did it come
from? The term has been around for some time in military case law,

19
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but it fades in and out of everyday use.16Generally, it means due process composed of, not only the constitutional protections, but also
statutory and regulatory features that provide guidance on how the
military justice system should work.
Recently it was used in an opinion by the Navy-Marine Corps Court
of Military Review in concluding that intentional delays in notifying
the accused of pending charges violated military due process!6 The
court applied a two-part test: The accused must establish that Congress granted a fundamental right and that this right was denied during the course of the trial. The court apparently ignored the concept of fundamental fairness. In my view, that case just as easily could
have been decided on grounds of lack of due process without referring to any congressional action or inaction.

3. What Is the Problem? It Is On13 a %rm
The term “military due process” seems relatively harmless. But
it may be misleading to the extent that it connotes a form of due
process that is somehow less than the process due to any defendant
charged with a crime or a template different from the one outlined
above. It is also problematic to the extent that it suggests that only
rights granted by Congress are worthy of protection by the military
courts. Because the term “Military Due Process” is potentially
misleading, it should be dropped or used only after reading the proverbial warning label. Such a label might read as follows:
The term “Military Due Process” may be misleading and lead
to incorrect results. Be sure to consult your copy of the Constitution, the Manual for Courts-Martial, and your Service
Regulations.
Simply affixing a warning label to the term, however, will not solve
the problem if the user does not believe the label or simply decides
to disregard the danger signs.

~~~~

~

I5See Quinn, Tiw Unzted States Court of Mzlztary Appeals a n d Mzlztary Dzir Pro
cess, 35 St John’s L Re\ 225 (1961)
I6See United States v Berrey, 28 M J 714, 718 ( N M C M R 1989)
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C. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
1. Do the Constitutional Protections Apply?
It is easy to forget that the military justice system as you see it
today is in some ways a youngster in the legal systems of the world.
Granted, the roots of the system of justice run back to the Roman
empire, up through the common-law traditions of England, to our
shores and our Con~titution?~
But the system as we know it, with
all of its due process protections, is relatively young.

It was not all that long ago that the debate swirled around the issue
of whether, and to what extent, the Bill of Rights applied to the
military justice system. For example, does the fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures applfl If so to
what extent? It was not until the 1970’s that the Court of Military
Appeals ruled that a service member confined before trial was en-.
titled under the fourth amendment to an independent review of the
commander’s decision ordering confinement.’*
Most of the rights are now considered applicable. Long before the
courts had decided that certain constitutional protections were
available, the Congress had made such rights a part of the Articles
of War and then later the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Even now, the question remains. Even assuming the protections
apply, do they apply with the same force and effect as they do to
the civilian community? The Supreme Court and Court of Military
Appeals have indicated that the protections of the Bill of Rights apply
to persons in the military except to the extent that they are overridden by demands of “discipline and duty.”lg Again, our answers are
not purely academic. Without regard to what the Congress or the
President says about the available due process protections, the Court
of Military Appeals might very well make a constitutional issue out
of it.
Although debate continues about the scope of protections provided by the fourth and fifth amendments, I would like to focus my comments on two particular rights that are found in civilian practice,
17D. Schlueter, supra note 8, $5 1-4 to 1-6(c) (history of courts-martial).
W e e Courtney v. Williams, 1 M.J.267 (C.M.A. 1976) (following Supreme Court’s decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)).
l8Id. at 270 (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)).
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but not in military justice. They are the right to indictment by grand
jury and the right to trial by jury. The first we can deal with summarily, the second requires a little more attention.

2. Right to Indictment by Grand Jury

Two rights that are conspicuously absent from the military justice
system are the right to grand jury proceedings and the right to a jury
trial. Both are considered essential elements of due process in the
civilian community. Although their true utility and worth may be
debated, they are part and parcel of American jurisprudence. Nevertheless, they are missing from military justice. W h p
In the case of indictment by grand jury, the fifth amendment explicitly exempts cases arising in the armed forces. The absence of
this right is generally noncontroversial because, in some ways, the
military’s statutory article 32 pretrial investigation offers greater protections for the military defendant.20That is, article 32 offers the
defendant the opportunity to discover the prosecution’s case, the
ability of the defendant and his or her counsel to be present at the
hearing, the opportunity to present defense evidence, and the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.

3. The Right to Jury Dial
Another right guaranteed by the United States Constitution that
is not applicable in courts-martial is the sixth amendment right to
a jury trial. Consequently, an accused being tried by a special courtmartial may appear before a court consisting only of three individuals. If the accused is being tried by a general court-martial,
only five individuals are required for the court. In each of those instances, a verdict of guilty may be rendered on less than a unanimous
vote. 21
The Supreme Court in Ballew v. Georgiaz2concluded that an accused is denied his sixth amendment right to jury trial when the jury
the
is composed of less than six persons. In Burch v. Louisiana,23
Court held that if the jury consists of six, the verdict must be
20UniformCode of Military Justice, art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1988) [hereinafter UCMJ].
WCMJ art. 52(a)(l). A unanimous verdict is required before the court-martial may
find an accused guilty of an offense for which the death penalty is a mandatory punishment.
22435 U.S. 223 (1978).
23441US. 130 (1979). Nonunanimous findings are apparently permitted if the jury
is composed of more than six persons.
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unanimous. Nevertheless, the Supreme Courtz4 and the military
courtsz5have concluded that, because the sixth amendment right
to jury trial does not apply to courts-martial, these cases are inapplicable. Both the Court of Military Appeals and the Supreme Court
have declined to revisit the issue.
Central to the Court’s conclusions in Burch was the fact that below
a certain number of jurors, the ability of the jury to interact in a
meaningful way-that is to bring out and discuss all of the pertinent
issues and competing arguments-was greatly diminished. Is not the
same true for military courts? At least one court has said no.26
Are there compelling arguments for the current composition of
courts-martial-five members in a general court-martial and three
in a special court-martial, with only two-thirds majority needed for
a conviction? Why are we different? In the 1774 Articles of War, thirteen members were required in general courts-martial, but in 1776
the number was reduced to five. The reduction apparently was based
upon the problem of finding sufficient officers in the units to serve
as court members. Probably, tradition has had much to do with the
current numbers.
But a new tradition, if that term is appropriate, may be developing. I understand that it is fairly common at some locations for the
convening authority to include more than five members on general
courts-martial. That practice does not seem to cause any problems.
Notwithstanding the inaction of the Supreme Court and the Court
of Military Appeals, why not amend the Uniform Code of Military
Justice to require a minimum of six in general ~ o u r t s - m a r t i a lIn
.~~
capital cases make it twelve. As I have noted, for all practical purposes, more than the jurisdictional minimum number of members
are being appointed at some installations. Why not simply make the
emerging “tradition” a part of the Code?
240’Callahanv. Parker, 395 U S . 258, 261 (1969); Reid v. Covert, 354 U S 1, 37 n.68
(1957).
%‘ee, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 M.J. 242, 248 (C.M.A. 1988); United States v.
Kemp, 46 C.M.R. 152, 154 (C.M.A. 1973).
W n i t e d States v. Corl, 6 M.J. 914 (N.M.C.M.R. 1979). Interestingly, the Navy court
pointed out that the Supreme Court had relied upon data derived only from civilian
sources, which had no probative value in the military context. Id.
27AlthoughI think similar reasoning could be used to support a court of six members
for a “regular” special court-martial, the Supreme Court decisions would seem to support less than six members when the offense being tried was a “petty” offense. Because
the jurisdictional limit of a regular special court-martial is six months of confinement,
the requirement of only three officers for that court, and the sixth amendment
guarantees of a right to trial by jury, are more in tune with each other.

17

MILITARY LAW REVIEW

[L’ol. 1:33

The requirement of unanimity is another question. The reason
usually given for not requiring unanimity is that it avoids the problem of a “hung jury.” I really doubt that in most cases that is a real
problem. To be in harmony with the Supreme Court cases I mentioned
earlier, any court consisting of six or less members should be required
to reach a unanimous verdict. An intermediate solution would be
to require a unanimous verdict, as it is currently required in capital
cases, on both findings and sentence when the maximum allowable
punishment on the charged offenses is above a certain minimum,
such as ten years.

It seems that the sixth amendment requirement of the right to a
jury trial could be applied much more liberally than it currently is
without doing any great harm to the way in which the military
operates. As I will note later, one of the real sticking points in military
justice is, not only the composition of the court, but also the method
of selecting members. A good start at tackling that overall problem
would be to give very serious consideration, as a number of commentators have, to the issue of the size of the court-martial.

D. THE ROLE OF THE COMMANDER
1. The Eagle

In the hallway of the main lobby of this School hangs a picture of
the head of an eagle, entitled simply “The Commander.” To me the
picture symbolizes the bold leader, the fearless leader, the leader willing to take the troops to new heights of pride and esprit de corps.
A symbol of freedom and liberty. To even suggest taking the commander-the eagle-out of the American military justice system
sounds unpatriotic. That is probably why the most appropriate role
of the commander in the military justice system is perhaps one of
the toughest to address. The commander always has been at the heart
of the military justice system, and to suggest removing the commander from the system, or to limit the role of the commander in
any way, is viewed by some as a sure demise of the uniqueness of
the system.28
Yet over the years, the commander’s role has been diminished
somewhat . . . and the system has survived. For example, when I first
came in the Army, the lives of young JAGS were consumed with drafting lengthy “post-trial reviews” that basically were an entire rehash
”See United States v. Ralston, 24 M.J. 709, 711 (A.C.M.K. 1987) (Appcndix).
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of the trial-a detailed summary of each witness’s testimony, presentation of legal issues, presentation of evidence favorable to the defendant, resolution of legal issues, and a recommendation from the SJA
to the commander. The system reached the point at which form clearly was being elevated over substance.
In the Military Justice Act of 1983, those requirements were whittled down, largely because of the recognition that the posttrial review
was primarily legal in nature and that lawyers could just as easily
make some major decisions about the post-trial disposition of the
case.
In 1983, another major change took place. The commander was
no longer required to appoint the counsel or the judge to the courtmartial. That task for a number of years had really been pro forma
anyway.

2. Selection of Court Members (Jury)
One important change was not made in 1983; the commander still
selects the members who sit on the court. That, in my view, continues to be a major problem area. Despite ail the areas in which
the defendant is granted more protections, the commander still picks
the jury. No matter how you view it or label it, the commander picks
the people who will decide whether the accused committed the offense and, if so, what the punishment should be.
In a concurring opinion in United States v. Smith ,2g a case addressing the process used to select the members for the accused’s courtmartial, Judge Cox noted that those responsible for the process
should reflect upon its importance as a ‘‘solemnand awesome responsibility.” The process of selecting members, he said, “is the most vulnerable aspect of the court-martial system; the easiest for the critics
to attack. A fair and impartial court-martial is the most fundamental protection that an accused servicemember has from unfounded
or unprovable charges.’’30
Why do we still have the commander selecting the members of the
court? Do not misread me. Commanders are picked for their integrity, their honor, and their respect for the law. They are the “eagle”the nation’s symbol. I am intimately familiar with the argument
“27 M.J. 242 ( C . M . A . 1988).
:31bM.
at 252.
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(because I have used it myself) that the military ‘jury” is composed
of top-notch people, most of them with college educations. I am
aware that the commander is responsible for picking people who are
mature and experienced. Despite those justifications for the present
system, the selection process is subject to continual challenges. At
a minimum, it looks bad. In legal parlance, the process can present
an appearance of evil. The fact that the Supreme Court and the Court
of Military Appeals have not ruled the process unconstitutional is
no reason not to consider a revision seriously. If we were to apply
a simple balancing test, would the benefit of the commander selecting the court outweigh the problems and the perceptions that it
causes?
One alternative would be to go with some sort of random selection. Everything is now on computers and they have become a
routine part of every legal office. The computer could be programmed
to turn out a cross-section of officers and enlisted members based
upon the language of article 25 and could be used to weed out those
who are due to rotate assignments or those who are scheduled for
TDY. I cannot believe that the same ingenuity that coordinated the
massive air strikes in the Middle East could not be used to select court
members for a court-martial when a service member’s liberty and
property interests are at stake.
Whatever system is used, the role of the prosecutor and the commander in the selection process should be reduced, if not eliminated.
Whatever administrative problems there might be, it simply has to
be better than responding to allegations of stacked juries.

3. Composition of the Courts
If there is any doubt where the civilian community gets the impression that military courts are less than the paradigm of impartiality, consider a sampling of cases in the last several years in which
defense counsel successfully or unsuccessfully challenged a number
of court members. Notwithstanding repeated statements to the effect that trial courts should grant challenges for cause liberally, the
military courts generally have hesitated to overrule trial court rulings denying a wide range of challenges for cause. Consider the
following sampling of cases in which such challenges were denied.

-Members who were given efficiency ratings by other members
of the court.31
31UnitedStates v. Murphy. 26 M.J. 454, 455-56 (C.M.A. 1988)
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-Members had been victims of multiple crimes.32
-Member who had personal interest and professional interest in
stopping bad checks sitting on a bad check case.33
-Member who had extensive prior civilian experience as social
services counselor appointed to child abuse case.34
-Member who expressed abhorrence to sexual offense on child
and acknowledged that his emotions would force him to be a little tougher on sentencing but that he could take cognizance of
his emotions.36
In the process of deciding these and many similar cases, the appellate courts have concluded that court members can rehabilitate
themselves through proper answers to the inquiring trial judge. At
least one court has indicated that the trial judge may use leading
questions in questioning the challenged court member.36It should
not be too difficult for any judge worth his or her salt to obtain a
statement from the member that, despite some bias toward the accused or the crime, the member will keep an open mind about the
case. The system should not put either the members or the trial judge
in that position. These instances and others like them are, in my view,
self-inflicted wounds. Cumulatively, they present the appearance of
evil.37Put yourself in the position of the accused, the accused’s family, and the public generally. What is their view of the composition
of the court? What would your view be if you were the accused?
The problems associated with composition of courts-martial probably need no statutory solution if those responsible for the assisting
in the selection process heed Judge Cox’s admonition and take extraordinary efforts to select the most objective fact-finders available.

4. Command Influence: The Mortal Enemy
The one issue that poses the greatest threat to any attempt to in3ZUnitedStates v. Smith, 25 M.J. 785, 788 (A.C.M.R. 1988).
33UnitedStates v. Carns, 27 M.J. 820, 822 (A.C.M.R. 1988).
34UnitedStates v. Towers, 24 M.J. 143, 146 (C.M.A. 1987).
36UnitedStates v. Yardley, 24 M.J. 719, 723 (A.C.M.R. 1987).
36UnitedStates v. Mayes, 28 M.J. 748, 752 (A.F.C.M.R. 1989).
37UnitedStates v. Swagger, 16 M.J. 759 (A.C.M.R. 1983). Incredibly, the convening
authority appointed the provost marshal to the accused’s court-martial, in which he
served as the president. The court noted that doing this created the appearance of
evil and that individuals assigned to police duties should not be appointed to courts.
Id. at 760.
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crease the respect of the public is the proverbial problem of unlawful
command influence-what the Court of Military Appeals has labelled
the “mortal enemy” of military justice. Whatever means are appropriate to stop it, whether that means developing a vaccine,
quarantining it, or warehousing it, we must get it off the streets. It
is no friend of the Corps nor of the system. It has caused more distrust
and personal turmoil than any other issue facing those running the
military justice system.

Do you know it when you see it? How will you know it? Will there
be an official looking memo? How do you know that you have not
become an unwitting victim of its snares? What should you do when
you see it?
From my personal experience, I will tell you that the issue is not
always open and obvious. For example, when I was an energetic
young JAGC captain serving as the Chief of Military Justice at Fort
Belvoir I realized that we often had problems communicating with
the members who had been selected to serve on a court-martial. They
would end up calling our office to find out all sorts of information
about the approximate length of the trial, where they should go, or
what uniform they should wear. At about that same time, a colleague
at another installation told me about a little booklet of information
that they had worked up giving all of that information. I liked the
idea and approached my boss with it. He objected. He pointed out
to me that it was good to try to simplify the process, but that real
dangers lurked in presenting “advice” or information to the members. He was concerned that anything said to the members, especially
by the prosecution side of the house, might be interpreted to reflect
the convening authority’s views. He also pointed out to me that the
booklet I had heard about contained a brief introduction by the convening authority on the solemn duties of being a court member. Was
my boss overreacting? At the time I thought he might be. My motives
were good. I simply wanted to make the system more efficient. But
in looking back on that incident, it serves to remind me that no matter how innocent the briefing, the memo, or the little talk might be,
trouble lurks.
For the next several years, we will all be keenly aware of the personal heartache and the sense of embarrassment that can befall even
the best lawyers and the best intentioned commanders. But how
many remember the name-or have even heard the name-of the
Commanding General at Fort Leonard Wood whose actions decades
ago gave rise to what we now know as the DuBay hearing, or any
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of the myriad other commanders or officers who said or did something that resulted in a finding of unlawful command influence? Our
institutional memories can be short, and in the process each generation of new JAGS must face the threat of unlawful command influence.

5. Should the Commander Be Removed From the System

I am not prepared to suggest that the commander-the eagleshould be removed totally from the system. My restraint is not based
upon the fear of “civilianization” of military justice. Nor is my restraint grounded upon a belief that the commander is an indispensable element in military justice. Instead, I am restrained from suggesting complete removal because the military society-whether it
be a post, camp, or station-is a “community.” Removing the commander totally from the processing of charges or the selection of
court members would not necessarily stem the problem of the indignant commander who has just been informed that charges against
the division’s drug lord have been dismissed on a “legal technicality.” Nor would it stem the problem of subordinate commanders saying or doing things that threaten the integrity of the court-martial.
It would be incorrect to blame the “commander” for all of the ills
of command influence. If there is one clear lesson for us today, it
is the responsibility of all those within the system, including lawyers,
to do all that is within their power to ensure that the system exemplifies all that is right with justice in this country.
The process of scrutinizing the role of the commander must continue. The irony is that within the military, there exist the resources
to combat virtually any problem that presents itself. Yet, the military
cannot rid itself of this one menace.
It may be that unlawful command influence never will be
eradicated and it may be that other methods will have to be found
to contain it. The question is, how strongly do we feel about
eradicating it? After all of these years, the Court of Military Appeals
finally has taken a stronger stand on the subject, and that is bound
to make some difference.
If the commander is to remain a key element in the military justice
system, then what we say and do about maintaining the independence of those called upon to judge the actions of the commander takes on even greater significance.
23
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E . THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY JUDICIARY
1. The Military Judge
If there is any hope of increasing respect for military justice it is
absolutely essential that the trial and appellate judiciary continue
to draw from the best and the brightest.38It is the judges who are
most often called upon to sort through and decide the knotty issues.
such as unlawful command influence. Trial judges are at the cutting
edge of the law, as they are in civilian life. Judges sitting in the trial
courtroom bear an awesome responsibility to see to it that justice
is done. The courtroom is where the public sees military justice.in
action. The military judge, sitting in the predominant position in the
courtroom, is the symbol of impartiality, not discipline: of justice,
not discipline; of impartiality, not bias.
For a military appellate judge, it means writing the persuasive opinion that spells out why the defendant was or was not granted a fair
trial. Appellate judges are not nearly as visible to the civilian community. But the task is just as important and vital. One feature that
is often overlooked is that the military appellate courts have the
authority to conduct an independent factual analysis. That gives
them even more responsibility than that carried by their civilian
counterparts who generally are required only to review questions
of law.

2.Assignments and Tenure
I am aware that some have suggested that to maintain independence it is important to stabilize tours for military judges or
grant some sort of tenure that ensures them that no matter how unpopular their decisions, they have some security. I am not sure that
is workable, but I would be willing to consider it. Why would such
a change even be necessary? To protect trial and appellate judges?
Once you start down the slippery slope of protecting the players who
are called upon to call the tough shots, where would we stop? The
SJA who initially tells the three-star general that his regulation is
unconstitutional because it is overbroad? The JAG who helped write
"This is a delicate matter. In the military justice system, all of the players a r t important. Rut I am afraid that, all too often, the goal of military lawyers is t o h e the
chief lawyer in a large office. In the Army, that means a corps o r division SJA. What
I am suggesting is that it is just as important to promote the idea that serving in the
capacity of a trial or appellate judge is "career enhancing." This is not a lrgislativr
issue; instead, it is a management issue

24

19911

HODSON LECTURE

it, or unsuccessfully objected to it? The defense counsel who
challenged it? The Court of Military Review that reviewed it? The
answer in protecting these people from retribution lies, not in granting tenure, but rather in taking appropriate action against any lawyer
or commander who attempts to interfere with a trial or appellate
judge's independence. All must understand that military justice is
not simply a formality for deciding when the accused gets on the
train for the Disciplinary Barracks. Anyone who views it in that light
is doing the system a disservice.

€? A N INDEPENDENT COURT OF

MILITARY APPEALS
Several years ago, I served as the reporter for the committee that
studied the Court of Military Appeals. The committee itself was composed of a number of distinguished individuals who had much to contribute to an in-depth analysis of what the court was about and how
it could better perform the function it was originally designed to
fulfill-civilian review of the military justice system.39
Ironically, the committee was viewed by some as being a stacked
deck-a handpicked committee that simply would endorse whatever
the court wanted. Those of you who have read the report know that
is not what happened. To the credit of Chief Judge Everett, the committee was composed of independent thinkers.

To say that the road the court has traveled since its formation in
1950 has been smooth would be to ignore the obvious. The road has
been rough. From the outset, the court has been criticized, maligned,
poked at, and probed. Some of its judges have contributed more than
others; some of its opinions have not stood the test of time, while
others have become part and parcel of military justice. Through it
all, the court has strived to meet the congressional mandate for
thorough, independent civilian review of courts-martial. As the committee concluded, it has done that.J0 The committee's suggested
changes were set out in detail in the report that gained some attention in the media-especially the committee's suggestion that the
court consider less travel in its plans.
One of the major issues addressed by the committee was the question of whether the court should be converted from an article I to
~

~

~

~~~~~

3HSrf~
25 M.J. at XClX (1987) (announcement o f c o w 1 appointing c o ~ i m i t t t ~ c )

4oSrc~
28 M.J 99.102 (report of committrc).
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an article I11 court. The committee ultimately declined to take a final
position on that question. Instead, it offered an alternative that
would have the court remain as an article I court, with the appointed
judges serving a term without years with retirement at age 70. The
committee believed that the other recommendations should be in
place first before the article I11 issue finally was decided.
Interestingly, the Department of Defense was opposed to any attempts to make the court an article I11 court. In an exhaustive study
of the issue, the 1988 Department of Defense report on the status
of the court included the following language:
Although Congress has stated its intent that COMA be a court
in every sense of the word, COMA is not as fully independent
as an Article I11 court. A COMA judge has no protection against
salary reduction; does not have life tenure for good behavior;
and can be removed by the President upon notice and hearing,
for malfeasance in office, neglect or duty, or physical or mental disability. A sitting Chief Judge of COMA can be replaced;
and COMA is still to a certain extent, dependent upon the Executive Branch for administrative support. The question which
needs to be answered is whether any of these differences
significantly impacts on COMAS ability to fulfil its judicial
duties.41

. . . COMA is a limited court serving a limited need. Albeit different, COMA is not unique among Art. I courts. Like other Article I courts, COMA is not an independent instrument of justice.
COMA is properly accountable to the Executive Branch, for it
is the President as Commander in Chief who bears ultimate
responsibility for the enforcement, through courts-martial of
the congressionally-adopted rules and regulations governing the
military forces.
...
. . . COMA is an integral part of the military justice system and
should not be separate and apart from it. Care should be taken
not to destroy the court's usefulness to the military judicial

41L'nitedStates Court of Military Appeals Report, Jan. 2 7 , 1989, at F-3
421d.at A+, 6
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A number of members on the committee observed that the more intransigent the Department of Defense became on the court’s independence, the greater the argument for some separation from the
Department of Defense-in much the same way that the federal
courts finally were separated from the Department of Justice in
1939.43
For now, the marriage between the court and the Department of
Defense appears stable and wholesome. It has not always been so,
however, and always lurking in the background is the specter of the
court facing a difficult constitutional issue that challenges a key
Department of Defense policy or regulation.
Why does the Department of Defense feel uncomfortable with the
suggestion of greater independence for the Court of Military Appeals?
Is there a concern that the court will run away with military justice
and civilianize it? Or do they fear that inexperienced and anti-military
judges will be appointed? These are not unreasonable concerns. But,
even as we speak, federal judges across the nation are reviewing decisions by military authorities and, for the most part, they are being
deferential to the military. Finally, there is always Congress, to which
the court is in more ways accountable than to the Department of
Defense or to the Executive. I have no doubt that a runaway court
could be held in check by Congress.
Although I advocate greater independence for the court, I do not
agree that the court should be the primary shaper or legislator of
military justice. Most of you were not in the service in the 1970’s
when the “Fletcher Court,” as we now call it, was churning out
weekly revisions to the military justice system. If an aspect of military
justice is unconstitutional, the court should have the authority to
say so, although I never have favored a wholesale revision of military
justice by any court acting as a super legislature.
Whatever is said or not said about the Court of Miiitary Appeals,
it is absolutely essential that it remain as independent as it possibly
can be. The court should stand as the symbol of independent civilian
review. That is what Congress intended when it created it in 1950.

G. THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
How many of you have been asked-What do military lawyers do
430neof the reasons for separating the administrative support of the federal courts
from the Department of Justice was that one of the litigants appearing before those
courts-the Department-had administrative control over those same courts.
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for a living The answer is that military lawyers make the military
justice system work. They are the key to the success of the system.
The system is only as good as the folks running it. I do not mean to
ignore mention of the essential support staff- the legal clerks and
administrators who make sure that the lawyers are working on the
right file and that the record of trial is correctly assembled. For the
critics, you represent the system. You are the lawyers. You are responsible for making it work well.

If the military justice system is to be respected, it is important that
when we, as lawyers, “cut the wood placed in front of us,” we do
it right. Many of the problems that I have addressed today are the
result of human error. That is, the underlying statutes and regulations may have provided ample protection, but somewhere along the
line an eager lawyer or commander, “cutting his or her pile of wood,”
attempted to “cut” corners, “whittle” away the accused’s rights, or
“stack” the court.
Other problems or issues I have discussed today are embedded in
the system itself and will require lawyers to work out with fine
surgical precision any changes in the system’sstructure. Within a few
short weeks some of you will be in a JAG office for the first time.
Whether the system gets the respect it deserves will depend as much
on you-who will be serving as trial or defense counsel-as it will
on the shoulders of those here today who are in, or will be in, positions of leadership.
Aside from your duties as a JAG officer, it is important that you
become involved in professional bar associations, such as the
American Bar Association, the Federal Bar Association, or your state
and local bar associations. In the process, you will present a positive
image of military law and you will continue to learn about the civilian
system. Write articles for civilian periodicals. Inform the public not
only about what you do, but what military law is all about.
The key is to contribute. We sometimes ask our children, Are you
part of the solution or are you part of the problem? Today I have
raised suggested solutions to a wide variety of potential or real problems. But we must continue to ask ourselves: Are we being part of
the problem, or are we part of the solution?

111. CONCLUSION
While there is no doubt in my mind that, at its core, the military
justice system is an excellent model, it is important to discuss prob28
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lem areas that deserve scrutiny. Some can be handled only through
legislative efforts. Others can be addressed through slight, internal
and informal changes in methodology. If the 1990’s are to see any
real change in the perception of military justice, some changes are
needed. Quick fixes through name changes will not suffice. The
system itself must be examined.
The goal of criminal justice always should be to ensure justicenot just convictions. The natural state of things is that the process
will continue to evolve. But in that evolution, will military justice
in the 1990’slag behind or pull ahead? With your help, it will become
the best that it can be and receive the respect it deserves.
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